New Zealand has wrong key on Fiji
In my last article I highlighted that New Zealand’s long involvement with Fiji goes back beyond 1874 when Fiji became a part of the British Empire.
In addition to genetic and sporting bonds, Fiji and New Zealand have long supported each other on foreign policy issues. When the Law of the Sea Treaty attracted the USSR to Kiribati tuna in 1986, Fiji’s was the foremost voice of alarm in the then South Pacific Forum.
When David Lange shook the ANZUS alliance in 1985 by barring nuclear-powered vessels from using NZ ports, Fiji followed suit two years later.
Compelling cases have been made linking Fiji’s first coup in 1987 to this landmark policy change that was reversed immediately by Rabuka. Speculations persist on whether Fiji continues to pay the price for supporting NZ at that critical juncture.
Direct contributions from NZ, on the other hand, have almost always been productive and well-received.
When Rabuka belligerently declared in 1992 that the world would have to wait for another 10yrs for Fiji’s return to democracy, NZ responded with a headshake. “Let them work it out” seemed to be the fuzzy political stance while innovative attempts were made to engage Rabuka and ease the return.
US ambassador Don Gervitz was one of the first to make inroads and Rabuka’s re-orientation followed his friendship with Don. Then Jai Ram Reddy entered the picture through 3rd party intervention and it was his diplomacy and Rabuka’s search for an acceptable solution that led to the constitutional review process.
Able leadership of this by New Zealand’s Sir Paul Reeves bequeathed Fiji its acclaimed 1997 constitution.
It appeared that Fiji was finally on the path to political maturity until in 2000, simmering traditional tensions and a number of related issues exploded in the Speight Coup. New Zealand was again overly-reliant on Fijian institutions for solutions. One kiwi however landed at Nadi Airport with more emotional intentions. Tama Iti was bundled out of the country after Speight reportedly asked, “who is Tama Iti?”
Anyway, the 2000 coup was followed by Laisenia Qarase as PM. He won the 2001 elections on the back of a $15m agricultural assistance scheme that had all the hallmarks of a scam.
Then he won the 2006 elections amid acrimonious controversy. An ACP observer group rubber-stamped the elections, but no one has yet been able to explain how in a country of just over 800,000 people some 600,000 votes could be declared valid!
Another alarming development characterised Qarase’s reign; supporters of the 2000 coup continued to be rewarded with impunity as traditional systems of forgiveness appeared to be abused with cheek.
When Commodore Bainimarama aired his reservations, effort focused on removing him as an obstacle.
The November 2000 mutiny at Delainabua was not only meant to re-entrench the coup-support faction of the Fiji military, it was also supposed to remove the Commander for good. Bainimarama escaped that fateful day with a renewed appreciation of the resolve and intentions of the forces against him.
When he ‘couped’ Qarase in December 2006, he was removing a dark legacy that would’ve plagued Fiji indefinitely. Just what was wrong with the Qarase government, and how could one justify the violent reversal of a democratic process is for another write-up. Here, the focus is on NZ’s role in Fiji.
In the lead-up to Bainimarama’s coup, Helen Clark offered to intercede and NZ aircraft transported Bainimarama and Qarase to Wellington where they met face-to-face after a long tug-of-war in Fiji that saw even the Great Council of Chiefs fail in its mediation efforts.
Winston Peters left that meeting smarting after Bainimarama stormed out declaring Qarase was not genuine. That outburst in Wellington invoked a classroom-type response from Helen Clark who wielded the whip that John Key now holds so awkwardly. New Zealand’s position on Fiji has lacked constructiveness and originality since.
At every forum that Fiji attends, NZ goes with an “either-or” dictate. This school-marmish approach has a number of serious negative fallouts: it pre-empts constructive engagement, it does not allow either Bainimarama or John Key any room to manoeuvre, and it fuzzes focus.
PM Key recently made a whirlwind aid-toting trip to Tonga, Samoa, Niue, and Rarotonga. It’d have felt better if the Pacific Heads of Government (PHG) meeting was not scheduled on the heels of this Polynesia tour by the PM. Any cynic would point to myopic machinations before the Cairns meeting.
Tongan PM Feleti Sevele had called for dialogue with Fiji during his attendance at school anniversary celebrations in Levuka last month. His Samoan counter-part Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi however, had been scathing in calling Bainimarama a wrongly dressed “thief’. Was it this lack of accord that John Key was worried about as he packed his bags for the Pacific?
While the Polynesian vows were being renewed, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) met and renewed calls to return Fiji to the fold for constructive engagement. The Small Island States (SIS), on the other hand, were seen to be scratching their heads amidst the confusion.
That forum is made up of three groups: the Melanesian bloc, the Polynesian pot and the Small Island States.
Within this, New Zealand and Australia have played a diplomatic role partly to further their own interests and partly to ensure that these states do not step out of line. The schisms that are being actively fomented for Cairns are likely to leave a lasting legacy – and it’s not just Fiji that will hurt afterward.
The opinions contained here are Subhash Appana’s own and not necessarily shared by any organizations that he may be affiliated with, both here and overseas.
Email: subhasha@ais.ac.nz
In my last article I highlighted that New Zealand’s long involvement with Fiji goes back beyond 1874 when Fiji became a part of the British Empire.
In addition to genetic and sporting bonds, Fiji and New Zealand have long supported each other on foreign policy issues. When the Law of the Sea...
In my last article I highlighted that New Zealand’s long involvement with Fiji goes back beyond 1874 when Fiji became a part of the British Empire.
In addition to genetic and sporting bonds, Fiji and New Zealand have long supported each other on foreign policy issues. When the Law of the Sea Treaty attracted the USSR to Kiribati tuna in 1986, Fiji’s was the foremost voice of alarm in the then South Pacific Forum.
When David Lange shook the ANZUS alliance in 1985 by barring nuclear-powered vessels from using NZ ports, Fiji followed suit two years later.
Compelling cases have been made linking Fiji’s first coup in 1987 to this landmark policy change that was reversed immediately by Rabuka. Speculations persist on whether Fiji continues to pay the price for supporting NZ at that critical juncture.
Direct contributions from NZ, on the other hand, have almost always been productive and well-received.
When Rabuka belligerently declared in 1992 that the world would have to wait for another 10yrs for Fiji’s return to democracy, NZ responded with a headshake. “Let them work it out” seemed to be the fuzzy political stance while innovative attempts were made to engage Rabuka and ease the return.
US ambassador Don Gervitz was one of the first to make inroads and Rabuka’s re-orientation followed his friendship with Don. Then Jai Ram Reddy entered the picture through 3rd party intervention and it was his diplomacy and Rabuka’s search for an acceptable solution that led to the constitutional review process.
Able leadership of this by New Zealand’s Sir Paul Reeves bequeathed Fiji its acclaimed 1997 constitution.
It appeared that Fiji was finally on the path to political maturity until in 2000, simmering traditional tensions and a number of related issues exploded in the Speight Coup. New Zealand was again overly-reliant on Fijian institutions for solutions. One kiwi however landed at Nadi Airport with more emotional intentions. Tama Iti was bundled out of the country after Speight reportedly asked, “who is Tama Iti?”
Anyway, the 2000 coup was followed by Laisenia Qarase as PM. He won the 2001 elections on the back of a $15m agricultural assistance scheme that had all the hallmarks of a scam.
Then he won the 2006 elections amid acrimonious controversy. An ACP observer group rubber-stamped the elections, but no one has yet been able to explain how in a country of just over 800,000 people some 600,000 votes could be declared valid!
Another alarming development characterised Qarase’s reign; supporters of the 2000 coup continued to be rewarded with impunity as traditional systems of forgiveness appeared to be abused with cheek.
When Commodore Bainimarama aired his reservations, effort focused on removing him as an obstacle.
The November 2000 mutiny at Delainabua was not only meant to re-entrench the coup-support faction of the Fiji military, it was also supposed to remove the Commander for good. Bainimarama escaped that fateful day with a renewed appreciation of the resolve and intentions of the forces against him.
When he ‘couped’ Qarase in December 2006, he was removing a dark legacy that would’ve plagued Fiji indefinitely. Just what was wrong with the Qarase government, and how could one justify the violent reversal of a democratic process is for another write-up. Here, the focus is on NZ’s role in Fiji.
In the lead-up to Bainimarama’s coup, Helen Clark offered to intercede and NZ aircraft transported Bainimarama and Qarase to Wellington where they met face-to-face after a long tug-of-war in Fiji that saw even the Great Council of Chiefs fail in its mediation efforts.
Winston Peters left that meeting smarting after Bainimarama stormed out declaring Qarase was not genuine. That outburst in Wellington invoked a classroom-type response from Helen Clark who wielded the whip that John Key now holds so awkwardly. New Zealand’s position on Fiji has lacked constructiveness and originality since.
At every forum that Fiji attends, NZ goes with an “either-or” dictate. This school-marmish approach has a number of serious negative fallouts: it pre-empts constructive engagement, it does not allow either Bainimarama or John Key any room to manoeuvre, and it fuzzes focus.
PM Key recently made a whirlwind aid-toting trip to Tonga, Samoa, Niue, and Rarotonga. It’d have felt better if the Pacific Heads of Government (PHG) meeting was not scheduled on the heels of this Polynesia tour by the PM. Any cynic would point to myopic machinations before the Cairns meeting.
Tongan PM Feleti Sevele had called for dialogue with Fiji during his attendance at school anniversary celebrations in Levuka last month. His Samoan counter-part Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi however, had been scathing in calling Bainimarama a wrongly dressed “thief’. Was it this lack of accord that John Key was worried about as he packed his bags for the Pacific?
While the Polynesian vows were being renewed, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) met and renewed calls to return Fiji to the fold for constructive engagement. The Small Island States (SIS), on the other hand, were seen to be scratching their heads amidst the confusion.
That forum is made up of three groups: the Melanesian bloc, the Polynesian pot and the Small Island States.
Within this, New Zealand and Australia have played a diplomatic role partly to further their own interests and partly to ensure that these states do not step out of line. The schisms that are being actively fomented for Cairns are likely to leave a lasting legacy – and it’s not just Fiji that will hurt afterward.
The opinions contained here are Subhash Appana’s own and not necessarily shared by any organizations that he may be affiliated with, both here and overseas.
Email: subhasha@ais.ac.nz
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