Government by greed: A model for vultures

In my last article I highlighted two major issues in Fiji’s attempts to bring Fijians into business: one the lack of appropriate capacity for commerce among Fijians, and two the flawed model being used to allocate and access money and then appropriate it to feed unarticulated interests. Within this framework a number of actors gained prominence.

Before we consider the role of these actors, the context has to be understood to follow the linkages involved. The Fiji of 1987 had a number of underlying characteristics. One, there was discontent among the Fijians who felt that PM Ratu Mara had not done enough to uplift them in terms of material wealth.

This was visibly heightened when they looked at the houses of Indians in the more exclusive suburbs of Suva and Lautoka. The comparison was fanned in the run-up to the 1987 elections as a rallying point for Fijian votes. In fact, before that fateful coup, many Indian houses had already been identified for takeover in little pocket meetings around Suva.

Moreover, Indian success was linked to dishonest practices in a twisted attempt to make sense of the changing environment. This had two effects: it justified vilification of Indians, and it removed the healthy motivating influence this should have had on the Fijian psyche as the fruits of hard work. 

The 1987 Fijian therefore, was basically punch-drunk with his desire for material progress, his inability to understand and come to terms with the conventional route to that wealth, and his distrust of the Indo-Fijian. He simply could not accept the Indo-Fijian as a role model (this fact has many reasons and will be dealt with in a later write-up).

A second factor was that Rabuka himself came from an exclusively Fijian background. He simply had no time for the Indian who he saw (like most other Fijians) as a successful group who were wallowing in ill-gotten gain and were forever complaining for more. Rabuka was unable to see the economic/class demarcations among the Indians at that point in time.

Furthermore, his economic model involved a Marshall Plan type influx of big amounts of money to take care of a haemorrhaging economy that he had contaminated with his style of politics. To this end, Rabuka commissioned an attempt to sell Soqulu Plantation, an exclusive millionaire’s enclave in Taveuni, to Asian interests (this story will follow later).

Secondly, he supported the move to entice $200m from Kuwait by allocating $10m of National Bank of Fiji (NBF) money to convicted conman, Tony Stephens. Thirdly, he supported Ah Koy’s program to allow Fijian citizenship to Chinese businessmen for a fee. This was supposed to open the money tap from China.

Rabuka’s economic model operated like a holed bucket placed under a water tap. Money was meant to flow into it like water from the tap and all would be well in Fiji. Unfortunately, Rabuka failed to see that the inflow was highly sensitive and never guaranteed. On the other hand, he underestimated the type and strength of outflow involved.

This brings us to the third factor. There was a cadre of Fijians who were eager to take greater responsibility for their personal success; this group were not prepared to move at the prescribed pace that characterized Mara’s reign. Among these were churchmen, marginal chiefs and politicians, and a group of qualified Fijians.

It is no secret that Rabuka’s reign was predicated on keeping a multiplicity of widely diverging interests satisfied. I have referred to these as “a host of hungry, disrespectful, undignified and fast interests”. This group found its opportunity in the precariousness of Rabuka’s regime and they moved in to consolidate his Prime Ministership and grab hold of key power positions for themselves. In the process, they marginalized Ratu Mara (more on this and its fallout later).

Coming back to the players who jockeyed into key positions, these included bureaucrats, consultants, bankers and politicians. The aim was to set up an infrastructure for the systematic plunder of national coffers. It was this group that operated behind the scenes, influenced policies and operationalized political decisions.

Traditionally whenever the Fijian had a problem, he approached his chief and/or churchman. If the issue needed government involvement, the churchman and/or chief approached the local government official at the provincial office. Later the individual could approach the bureaucrat directly, but had to use the traditional conduit for support.

After 1987, this took a slight, but significant turn with the bureaucrat/consultant/politician becoming involved directly. Fortunately, an ideological shift in government policy in the developed world, where process was being supplanted by outcomes, fell in line with the aspirations of bureaucrats who had hijacked the administrative apparatus in Fiji.

Rabuka’s policy on enhancing Fijian business provided the umbrella to facilitate the flow of cash from institutional coffers, through intermediaries to the final recipient. Thus when the Fijian business aspirant needed help, he approached his local consultant, politician or churchman. The classic case of this model in operation was presented by Equity Investment Company Limited (EIMCOL).

Established in 1989, EIMCOL was aimed to fast-track Fijian commercial participation in the retail sector. Despite a comprehensive report against the initiative by Julia Hamilton-Peach, EIMCOL galvanized a number of briefcase-toting business aspirants. Potential supermarkets were identified and managers trained by Fiji Development Bank (FDB) to take over.

The supermarket identification process was interesting because it involved a number of bureaucrats and consultants. Jone Tabuya was a key man in the process and well-connected Fijians were finally set up in 8 supermarkets that were bought by FDB for a total of $2.15m (Review, Dec. 1992). The aim was to use these as “living classrooms”.

When the scheme collapsed, the supermarkets were sold at giveaway prices that reportedly involved the same consultants and bureaucrats operating as intermediaries. As an example, Caubati Supermarket was bought for $230,000 and given away for $120,000 during a business boom period. FDB wrote off the losses and the intermediaries made a killing. Stay tuned for more on this model of plunder and get-rich-quick.

Subhash Appana is an academic and political commentator. The opinions contained in this article are entirely his and not necessarily shared by any organizations he may be associated with both in Fiji and abroad. Email subhasha@ais.ac.nz