A notable fallout of the recent general election in Bangladesh - the first since the collapse of the Sheikh Hasina government in 2024 - is that the youth uprising that precipitated it lost steam after it was co-opted by the hardline Jamaat-e-Islam, now in Opposition.
That caused the pendulum to swing from one dynastic party to the other. The Awami League, which was barred from contesting the poll, turned over the reins to the other historically dominant party in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
Voters also endorsed constitutional reforms via a referendum, which symbolises the enduring legacy of the student protest movement of 2024.
India will be closely monitoring events in Bangladesh, especially with elections due in states such as Assam and West Bengal, where border tensions and the sharing of river waters are hot-button issues.
New Delhi is wary of a possible geopolitical realignment with the BNP government pivoting towards Pakistan and China.
New Delhi’s continuing sanctuary for Sheikh Hasina amid calls for her extradition is an ongoing irritant in bilateral ties. But whether relations will unravel around the Hasina factor is a question that remains muted for the present.
For now, bilateral relations are firmly embedded in their historical settings.
Security cooperation between the neighbours is an overarching priority, defined by annual military exercises, joint naval patrols, defence dialogues and purchases. Rolling back that cooperation would be impolitic and counterproductive.
Likewise, trade remains the adhesive that binds the two nations, with Bangladesh being India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, and cotton supplied by India the spine of the garment industry that sustains Bangladesh’s economy.
Nevertheless, the pre-election turbulence calls for a reset in the ties between India and Bangladesh.
Delhi has a fraught history with the BNP dating back to 2001, when the party under Khaleda Zia regained power in Bangladesh in alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami. Border tensions spiralled and minority Hindus were targeted within Bangladesh. Diplomatic ties turned frosty.
By contrast, Sheikh Hasina filled the diplomatic void and earned Delhi’s goodwill. While in power, Hasina prioritised India’s concerns over border security by putting the squeeze on insurgency.
Dhaka is under no illusion that entertaining any expectation that New Delhi can be pressured to extradite Hasina to face her death sentence, passed in absentia, is a foreign policy dead end.
But the BNP dispensation in Dhaka will likely face mounting pressure from the Opposition Jamait-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (comprising student protest leaders) to keep Hasina’s repatriation on its foreign policy agenda.
That would make Delhi’s task of navigating the new phase in bilateral relations with its neighbour more complex and ambivalent.
This could manifest not least in a flagging resolve to curb separatist activity on India’s border, an uptick in dependence on China’s Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure programme, a hardline stance on sharing water from the Teesta and Padma rivers, and sluggish efforts to restore visa and people-to-people ties frozen during the protest turmoil.
This contrasts with the confidence building measures Dhaka has undertaken to mend fences with Pakistan, including restoring direct connectivity with Karachi as well as heightened diplomatic and military exchanges.
While geography and the economy guarantee India’s primacy as a neighbour, Bangladesh is looking beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
India is having to contend with the reality of a possible axis between Bangladesh, Pakistan and China.
It remains to be seen how Bangladesh’s new Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman, heir to his late mother Khaleda Zia’s political legacy, chooses to recalibrate equations in the South Asian region.
Venu Menon is a senior journalist based in Wellington. He was Consulting Editor of The Hindu in India prior to moving to New Zealand.